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General-equilibrium models for studying monetary influences in general and the zero lower bound
on the nominal interest rate in particular contain implicit theories of unemployment. In some cases,
the theory is explicit. When the nominal rate is above the level that clears the current market for output,
the excess supply shows up as diminished output, lower employment, and higher unemployment. Quite
separately, the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model is a widely accepted and well-developed account
of turnover, wage determination, and unemployment. The DMP model is a clashing theory of unemployment,
in the sense that its determinants of unemployment do not include any variables that signal an excess
supply of current output. In consequence, a general-equilibrium monetary model with a DMP labor
market generally has no equilibrium. After demonstrating the clash in a minimal but adequate setting,
I consider modifications of the DMP model that permit the complete model to have an equilibrium.
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rehall@gmail.comA landing on the non-Walrasian continent has been made. Whatever further
exploration may reveal, it has been a mind-expanding trip: We need never go
back to _ p = (D   S) and q = min(D;S).
Phelps and Winter (1970)
With the short-term nominal interest rate near its minimum feasible value of zero in the
U.S. and some other advanced economies for the past few years, macroeconomics has renewed
and advanced the study of the implications of the zero lower bound for economic activity in
general and unemployment in particular. According to the models, when the interest rate is
held above its market-clearing level, the supply of current output exceeds demand. Actual
current output falls short of its market-clearing level and unemployment is above its normal
level. The models provide a widely accepted account of the low levels of output and high
levels of unemployment in recent years. Notwithstanding Phelps and Winter's declaration
four decades ago, the q = min(D;S) model has a rm grip on macroeconomic thinking.
At the same time, the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model of unemployment is
widely accepted as the most realistic account of unemployment based on a careful and full
statement of the underlying economic principles governing labor turnover and wage deter-
mination. The model is relentlessly non-Walrasian|it describes transactions, not market-
clearing.
Although the zero lower bound stimulated this paper and much other recent work, I frame
the issue somewhat more generally, as the consequences of a short-term risk-free nominal
interest held above the level that would clear the intertemporal output market. The zero
lower bound is one reason for an elevated nominal rate, but central-bank policy is another.
Whenever a central bank raises its policy rate to a high level to head o ination, the issues
in this paper are in play.
The starting point for this paper is the incompatibility of the DMP account of the labor
market and the view of unemployment embedded in a simple general-equilibrium model that
generates high unemployment as a consequence of an elevated nominal rate. A compact
explanation is that, in the general-equilibrium model with the interest rate held above its
market-clearing level, the model lets unemployment be a free variable that adjusts to clear
the current output market. On the other hand, the DMP model prescribes the unemployment
rate as a function of a limited set of variables, none of which responds to excess supply in the
current output market. The two theories of unemployment clash. Another way to express
2the conclusion is that a simple GE model extended to include the DMP labor market has
no solution with an elevated nominal rate.
The clash just described is only the starting point for the paper, because extensions of
the DMP model do let unemployment respond to forces from the product market. Much of
the paper considers those extensions in the hope of nding a general-equilibrium model with
a DMP labor market that retains the ability of a general-equilibrium model to account for
the large increase in unemployment that generally occurs when the zero interest bound is
binding, while retaining DMP's account of that high level of unemployment as an equilibrium
of the labor market.
A reconciliation of general-equilibrium models with DMP would deal with a signicant
deciency in a number of existing applications of general-equilibrium modeling to the zero-
lower-bound economy in particular and an elevated nominal rate in general. Those models
arbitrarily (but totally realistically) pick out the labor-market-clearing condition to fail, while
requiring the other equilibrium conditions of the model to hold. In particular, consumers
continue to satisfy their Euler equations. Adding a new equation to a general-equilibrium
model|the equation that pins the nominal interest rate at zero or some other elevated
value|seems to call for dropping one existing equation. The obvious choice is labor-market-
clearing. But no rationale for that choice, based on economic fundamentals, has appeared
in the literature on monetary policy in general equilibrium.
The DMP model of the labor market replaces the simple labor-market-clearing condition
of a general-equilibrium model. But it is not a candidate to be dropped out when the zero
lower bound is binding. Some other free variable must appear in the model to allow the
model to have a solution in which employment in the product market is consistent with
unemployment that satises the DMP equations.
I consider several potential reconciliations of clashing unemployment theories. One makes
the ination rate the needed free variable. If expected ination is high enough, an elevated
nominal rate does not imply an elevated real rate, and the economy can have a standard
equilibrium where the DMP equations provide the equivalent of a simple labor-market clear-
ing condition. That is obvious and uninteresting. The Federal Reserve has been hoping for
that much ination since 2008 but has been unable to achieve it. There is a second possi-
ble equilibrium, the one that might describe economies with high unemployment at the zero
bound, notably the United States. Here is the scenario: Adverse developments in the product
3market|the collapse of durables demand in general and homebulding in particular|bring a
negative equilibrium real interest rate. The rate of ination falls a bit. With the zero lower
bound on the nominal rate elevating it above the market-clearing level, the unemployment
rate consistent with the outcome in the product market is high. In the DMP part of the
model, employers face low incentives to recruit new workers. The reason is that the starting
real wage is a xed amount|a social norm. But the wage remains constant in nominal
terms for a couple of years, so with diminished ination, the present value of the real wage
is higher when ination is lower. The DMP model makes unemployment highly sensitive
to this present value, because the employer's incentive to recruit depends on the dierence
between present value of the worker's marginal product and the present value of the wage.
The higher real wage causes the DMP unemployment rate to be higher. There may be an
ination rate|possibly negative|where the two models agree and the clash resolved. I em-
phasize the \may"|in the model of this paper, it is hard to generate such an equilibrium.
In many cases there is no such ination rate and the combined model has no solution.
A second reconciliation restores unemployment as a free variable, but with an equilibrium
interpretation. In the DMP model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the unemployment
rate is one of the determinants of the net value to an employer from a new hire. When
unemployment is high, a bargaining job candidate's outside option is less valuable, because
nding another employment opportunity is harder. In the Nash bargain, the employer gains
more of the surplus. Employers recruit more aggressively because the payo to a new hire
is greater. High unemployment disappears. Absent some other change, such as a decline
in productivity, unemployment has a unique equilibrium. All this follows from the Nash-
bargained wage. Now consider an alternative bargaining protocol that makes the employer's
share of the surplus decline slightly with unemployment. With just the right amount of
decline, the DMP equilibrium becomes indeterminate. This setup violates no principle of
bargaining. I call this the exible unemployment hypothesis. This version of the DMP model
provides a full rationale for the otherwise arbitrary assumption of many existing GE models
that the unemployment rate is a free variable.
Neither of these reconciliations is truly satisfactory. Both rest on arbitrary properties
of the wage-determination part of the DMP model. In the rst, under deation, employers
suer a disadvantage arising from the unexplained stickiness of nominal wages. In the
second, employers suer a similar disadvantage from paying their workers a bit more when
4unemployment is high.
A third approach|as yet undeveloped|interprets the product market as remaining out
of equilibrium when the zero bound is binding. Employers perceive low gains to adding
a worker because they cannot sell the extra output the worker produces. Most informal
discussions of the macroeconomics of the zero lower bound seem to adopt this view. The
time may be ripe for a formalization.
Lastly, an active body of recent research has documented a reduction in matching ef-
ciency in the labor market during the period of the zero lower bound. The DMP model
implies a rise in unemployment when the matching process generates fewer hires given un-
employment and vacancies. An interesting unresolved question is whether the decline in
matching eciency is the result of the excess supply of current output associated with the
excessive current real interest rate.
The paper starts with a reduced-form summary of the basic issue. Next is a discussion
of the labor market and the properties of the DMP model. Then it develops a general-
equilibrium model embodying the DMP model of the labor market and a model of the
product market based on standard principles. Finally, it explores the conditions under
which the model has equilibria with high unemployment and an elevated nominal interest
rate. These conditions are quite restrictive.
1 The Basic Issue
In this section, I demonstrate the clash of unemployment theories using the simplest reduced
forms. The remainder of the paper provides the underlying details.











The reduced form of the DMP model of unemployment maps productivity y=n into the
unemployment rate u:
u = U(y=n): (4)
5In principle, the interest rate also enters this function, but nothing of importance is lost by
neglecting that dependence.
Product demand is a function of the real interest rate r:
y = D(r): (5)
Then the two components of the complete model, describing product and labor markets,
is
Labor market: u = U(D(r)
1 1=) (6)
and




The normal equilibrium occurs when the real interest rate satises
U(D(r)




The clash arises when the central bank's policies result in a value of r higher than the
equilibrium value. The model fails to provide a coherent account of the economy's behavior
in that situation. The product-market part of the model dictates an unemployment rate that
is higher than normal because of an excess supply of current output. The DMP model, on the
other hand, dictates a dierent|generally lower|unemployment rate based on productivity.
Nothing about the excess supply of current output makes its way into the DMP model.
2 The Labor Market
I adopt a simple version of the DMP theory of unemployment. Like much of the recent
literature on the DMP model, I consider modes of wage determination dierent from the
Nash bargain of the canonical model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Also, I simplify
the treatment of labor-market dynamics by considering only the stochastic equilibrium of
labor turnover, which means that the unemployment rate u measures the tightness of the
labor market. The vacancy rate enters the picture only in fast transitional dynamics of the
matching process, which can be ignored in a quarterly model without losing much. Thus
the recruiting success rate is an increasing function h(u) of the unemployment rate. Success
is higher when unemployment is higher and employers nd qualied job-seekers more easily.
Hall (2009) discusses this approach more fully.
6Without loss of generality, I decompose the wage paid to the worker into two parts, cor-
responding to a two-part pricing contract (the decomposition is conceptual, not a suggestion
that actual compensation practices take this form). The worker pays a present value J, the
job value, to the employer for the privilege of holding the job and then receives a ow of
compensation equal to the worker's marginal product.
The essence of the DMP model of unemployment is a pair of equations involving the job
value. The rst holds that, in equilibrium, rms expect zero prot from recruiting workers.
The cost of recruiting (holding a vacancy open) is  per period, taken to be constant in output
terms. The zero-prot condition for recruiting equates the expected benet of recruiting to
its cost:
h(u)J = : (9)
Thus unemployment rises if the job value J falls. In slack markets with lower J, a worker
pays less for a job. Because h(u) is a stable function of unemployment alone and  is a
constant, the DMP model implies a stable relationship, JZ(u), between unemployment and
the job value.
The second equation|which I call wage determination|states the job value J = ~ J(u;)
as a function of u and certain other determinants. In Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), a
worker and an employer make a Nash bargain that sets a wage to divide their joint surplus in
xed proportion. Unemployment is one of the determinants of the Nash job-value function|
when unemployment is high, the match surplus arising from labor-market frictions is greater.
The job value, a xed share of that surplus, is also higher. The worker has to pay more for
the job because jobs are harder to nd. Two other variables|the marginal product of labor,
p, and the ow value of time spent not working (as an improvement over working), z, also
enter the Nash job-value function. These are the two elements of the vector  in ~ J(u;). The
DMP literature has concentrated on explaining movements in unemployment as responses
to changes in total factor productivity, which is the fundamental underlying determinant of
the marginal product of labor. Movements in the ow value of not working, z, rarely gure
in explanations of unemployment.
Another potential source of shifts of the wage-determination equation is ination. The
job-value function will deliver a higher value of J when ination is expected to be higher, to
the extent that ination erodes the real value of the bargained initial wage during the course
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Figure 1: DMP Account of an Increase in Unemployment Caused by a Decline in Productivity
Figure 1 shows the DMP account of the increase in a recession as explained in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994). In consequence of a drop in productivity, the Nash wage determination
curve shifts downward. The new equilibrium occurs down and to the right along the stable
zero-prot curve.
Two developments have cast doubt on the relevance of the recession mechanism of Figure
1. First, Shimer's (2005) inuential paper showed than it would take a gigantic drop in
productivity to cause the rise in unemployment in a typical recession, based on realistic
values of the parameters of the DMP model. Second, the recent behavior of productivity is
inconsistent with a model that relates the level of unemployment to the level of productivity.
Figure 2 shows John Fernald's extension to quarterly frequency of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' measure of total factor productivity in U.S. business since 1999. Productivity
fell sharply at the outset huge contraction that started in 2008. Then it rebounded equally
sharply, enough to restore its level to its previous growth path. Over the same period,
unemployment rose sharply and has remained close to its maximum level.
Shimer's paper has stimulated an interesting literature|surveyed in Rogerson and Shimer
(2010)|that alters the canonical DMP model to boost the response of unemployment to
productivity. But with rising productivity in a recession, the stronger response is an embar-
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Figure 2: Total Factor Productivity, 1999-2010
model.
2.1 Shifts of the zero-prot curve
The DMP account of recessions generally took the zero-prot curve to be stable and viewed
the rise in unemployment in a recession as a movement along that stable curve, resulting
from a shift of the wage-determination curve. Recently that view has come into question, as
the matching process has become less eective and unemployment has remained high even
though vacancies have risen. I explore this topic briey at the end of the paper. I am skeptical
that shifts of the zero-prot curve played a dominant role in the rise in unemployment since
2008, but recognize that something happened in the labor market that shifted the curve
adversely.
2.2 The wage-determination curve
In this discussion, I assume that the separation rate is a constant s. Data from JOLTS and
the CPS support this assumption as a useful rough approximation. The separation rate has
declined along a smooth trend in recent decades.
Figure 3 shows two extremes among the many models of wage determination under recent
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Figure 3: Alternative Views of Equilibrium Unemployment
wage-determination curve labeled Nash bargain plots the employer's half of the surplus under
a symmetric Nash bargain in the DMP model, according to equation (4) in Shimer (2005):
~ JN(u) = 0:5
p   z
r + 0:5(u) + s
: (10)
Here ~ JN(u) is the job value, the part of the surplus the employer captures, z is the ow
benet of not working, which I take to be 70 percent of p (see Hall and Milgrom (2008)), r
is the real interest rate, which I take to be 5 percent per year, (u) is the job-nding rate
function, which I take from the lower panel of Table 1, and s is the separation rate, which
I take to be 5 percent per month. I take p to have the value that generates the job value
shown in Figure 12 at 5.5 percent unemployment, J = $1,040.
The only plausible source of a major shift of the Nash wage-determination function is
a decline in p   z. In turn, given the implausibility of an increase in the value of non-
employment activities z as the causal force of a recession, the only possible source of a jump
in unemployment is a decline in the marginal product of labor, p. Shimer (2005) showed that
only a large decrease could bring about the 5-percentage-point increase in unemployment
that occurred in 2008 and 2009. But, apart from its initial plunge and recovery, productivity
actually rose during that period. Shifts of the Nash wage-determination function are unlikely
candidates for explaining the recent rise in unemployment or any other important movements
10in unemployment as well. Here I am excluding Hagedorn and Manovskii's (2008) Nash-
bargaining model, which makes the contrary claim, on the grounds that its parameters
imply much too high a Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The at line in Figure 3 labeled Rigid wage illustrates Shimer's (2004) proposition that a
rigid wage, unresponsive to conditions in the labor market, would lead to a highly unstable
wage-determination curve and thus support explanations of large movements of unemploy-






A small decline in p or a small increase in w would lower the rigid-wage line in Figure 3
and generate a large increase in unemployment. Note that the wage-rigidity model is quite
specic about the driving force|uctuations in p or w have huge eects, but other potential
driving forces do not shift the wage-determination curve at all and cannot explain a large
increase in unemployment in the DMP framework.
Other contributions to the recent DMP wage-determination literature have not extended
the sources of shifts of the wage-determination curve outside those just discussed, except for
Gertler and Trigari (2009) and its progeny, which invoke nominal stickiness. I investigate
this topic extensively later in the paper. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) present alternative
parameter values for the Nash wage-determination case, but the source of shifts of the wage-
determination curve remains productivity. Hall and Milgrom (2008) adopt an alternating-
oer bargaining setup, which brings delay costs into the model as additional determinants of
unemployment, but these costs are not portrayed as sources of uctuations|they are taken
as stable parameters.
2.3 Specifying the labor-market model
I adopt a specication for the DMP wage-determination equation that nests an equation
with properties similar to those used in the DMP literature and an equation that captures
the basic feature of New Keynesian models where workers have higher bargaining power
when the price level is declining, because the real value of the wage norm rises. The norm of
wage determination is that the initial wage bargain is a constant fraction  w of the stationary
value of the marginal product of labor. Wages are indexed to prices with an elasticity of
1   !. In the standard DMP specication, ! = 0. If the wage is xed in nominal terms
11for the duration of the job, ! = 1. Thus ! is a measure of nominal wage stickiness. Jobs
last an average of just over two years in the model, so this specication is plausible. The
wage-determination function with positive ! resembles the New Keynesian formulation in,
for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), where workers set wages in nominal
terms and can only adjust them at random intervals. However, the function is simpler
because it does not hypothesize that wage setting anticipates the wage erosion from ination
and osets it by raising the initial wage.
The job value is the present value of the dierence between the marginal product of labor
and the wage. Although there is no obstacle to evaluating the job value exactly, I introduce
two approximations for other reasons. The rst is to use the stationary value of the marginal
product of labor rather than the realized stochastic value. The result is to stabilize the job
value in much the same way that the Nash bargain in the DMP model stabilizes it. In that
model, a higher marginal product enhances the worker's outside option almost in proportion,
so the surplus is not much aected by higher productivity. The job value is the employer's
given share of the surplus, so the job value does not respond much to changes in the marginal
product of labor. Shimer (2010) describes the settings where, as in the specication adopted
here, shifts in productivity have no eect on unemployment.
The second simplication is to use the utility discount ratio  rather than the economy's
stochastic discounter in evaluating the job value. This simplication has no eect on any
conclusion of the paper. I make the assumption to rule out unemployment uctuations from
changing discount rates.
The economy has two state variables, the capital stock k and exogenous purchases g. I
treat all other variables as functions of the state variables, but, where clear, I omit writing
the arguments explicitly. I denote next period's value of a variable with a prime (0).
The components of the job value, J = L   W, are
L =
M
1   (1   s)
; (12)
the present value of the stationary value of the marginal product of labor M, and W, the
present value of the wage. When g = 0, W obeys the recursion,
W(k;0) =  wM
 +   (1   s)(k;0)
 ![(1   )W(k
0;0) + W(k
0;  g)]: (13)
The worker hired last quarter has the same wage prospects as the worker hired this quarter,
except that the earlier hire enjoys the benet of an increase in wages from wage stickiness
12in the face of deation that applies in the same proportion to all future wages on this job.
Hence the present value of wages in the next quarter is the same proportion of the present
value to be received by new hires in that quarter, W(k0;0) or W(k0;  g). Because no deation
occurs once g pops up,
W(k;  g) =  wL: (14)
Unemployment u solves the zero-prot condition,
h(u)J = : (15)
With a linear hiring-rate function h(u),







Table 1 in section 8 presents estimates of the parameters h0 and h1.
Once g rises,  is constant at one, so unemployment is also constant:
u( g) = u
: (18)
Employment is
n(k;g) = 1   u(k;g): (19)
3 The Product Market with an Elevated Nominal In-
terest Rate
Now I will turn to the product market, with a focus on what happens when monetary policy
creates high unemployment by holding the nominal risk-free interest rate above the level that
clears the intertemporal output market, possibly because of the zero lower bound. The point
of the discussion is that a macro model of the type considered in the literature on monetary
policy and the zero lower bound is a self-standing theory of unemployment, unconnected
with the principles of the DMP theory of unemployment. Macroeconomics has a pair of
clashing views about unemployment.
133.1 Model
Much of the model I develop in this section follows in the footsteps of Krugman (1998) and
the more recent work on the zero lower bound, stimulated rst by Japan's experience with
the bound and most recently and abundantly by experience in the United States and other
countries during the worldwide slump that began in 2008. See, in particular, Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2011), and Eggertsson and Krugman (2011).
The literature on the zero lower bound mostly stays close to the New Keynesian principles
exemplied in Christiano et al. (2005). These principles dominate current discussions of
how monetary policy in general inuences output and employment. Although I adopt a
streamlined model drawn from the zero lower bound literature, my remarks apply as well to
New Keynesian and related models.
To simplify many of the equations in the model, I use ratios rather than rates. Thus Rn
is the nominal interest ratio, 1 plus the nominal interest rate, and  is the ination ratio,
next quarter's price level divided by this quarter's.
3.2 Elevated risk-free nominal interest rate
The zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is currently the salient cause of an elevated
nominal rate. The lower bound arises because investors have the option of holding currency.
If the safe nominal rate were negative, currency would be a safe alternative yielding a higher
return, so nancial markets could not be in equilibrium. A more general statement of the
same proposition is that if the government oers a security at a xed nominal rate|such as
zero on currency|the safe nominal interest rate cannot be less than that xed rate. Modern
monetary policy, as adopted by many central banks in advanced economies, including those
of Canada and Sweden, controls the safe nominal rate by paying one rate on bank reserves
and lending to banks at a slightly higher rate. Equilibrium in nancial markets must occur
at a nominal rate in the corridor between the two rates. The analysis of this paper applies
equally to the analysis of the eect of variations in the central bank's policy rate. When the
central bank raises the policy rate to cool the economy o, the issue that occupies this paper
arises directly: Does unemployment rise because the higher rate causes an excess supply of
current output, or because it induces a shift in the equilibrium of the labor market according
to the principles of the DMP model? The goal of the paper is to nd a combined model
14where the answer is \both."
The zero lower bound arises from the impracticality of collecting negative interest from
holders of currency|see Buiter (2009). If the risk-free interest rate fell below zero, currency
would become an asset that paid above its appropriate return|it would be a government
giveaway because it would pay a risk-free return of zero. The model cannot have such a
giveaway, as discussed in Hall (2011) and the prior literature cited there. Thus Rn  1.
When the central bank sets a reserve rate at Rr and a lending rate R`, the nominal rate
is bounded on both sides:
Rr  Rn  R`: (20)
Central banks using this strategy generally set Rr and R` quite close to each other, so for
simplicity I will take the policy to be
Rn = Rp; (21)
where Rp is the policy rate: Rp = :5(Rr + R`). The policy rate sets the nominal risk-free
rate throughout the economy. That rate cannot drop below the policy rate for the same
reason that it cannot drop below zero in the presence of currency|reserves would become
a security paying a giveaway rate. The policy rate is also the upper bound on the nominal
rate|no bank would hold reserves if other risk-free investments paid more. Central banks
using the corridor strategy do not have binding reserve requirements.
The policy rate also controls the risk-free nominal rate under the old style of central
banking that the Fed practiced until late 2008, where reserves earned no interest and banks
avoided holding reserves above the level of reserve requirements. The shadow return to
reserves, as revealed in the interbank lending rate, plays the same role as explicit interest on
reserves in modern central banking. The analysis in this paper describes the consequences
of a policy rate set above the level that clears the current market for output. In particular,
it applies to the period from 1980 to 1982, when the Fed pushed the interbank rate to
extraordinary levels and unemployment soared.
3.3 Ination
The standard approach in modern macroeconomics is to use the Taylor rule to describe the
actions of the monetary authority. The rule dictates the nominal interest ratio given ination
15and the unemployment rate:
Rn = max(0 +    uu;1): (22)
A binding lower bound disables the Taylor rule. In the economy subject to the bound, one
can think of the ination rate as a free variable, provided
 <
1   0 + uu

: (23)





the Fisher equation. For convenience, I treat current ination, , as known in the current
period, even though it is in principle the ratio of the stochastic p0 to the current p. Near-term
ination is highly predictable in the U.S., so little is lost by this simplication.
In this paper, I mostly treat ination as a free variable, even when a Taylor rule might
actually inuence its value. For some purposes, I take the ination ratio as given. I also
investigate the ination ratio that would reconcile the DMP model and the product-market
model. As a general matter, this paper sidesteps the truly dicult question of what deter-
mines the rate of ination.
3.4 The driving force: rising exogenous component of product
demand
For simplicity, I take the driving force of the model to be a temporary shortfall in an exoge-
nous component of product demand. I call this variable exogenous purchases. In Hall (2011)
I measured the temporary burden of repaying the bulge of debt that household took on dur-
ing the 2000s and I inferred that this burden resulted in a shortfall of consumption among
households that are at the corner of their intertemporal allocation problem and thus borrow
as much as they can. When lenders cut back in consumer credit, these households are forced
to cut consumption during the period when their outstanding debt is falling. Households not
at the corner, whose Euler equations govern their consumption growth, anticipate that their
consumption will fall once the constrained households resume normal levels of consumption.
During the period of expected consumption shrinkage, the real interest rate is low. In fact,
in the calibration I use, the real rate is negative. Here, I take the simplest version of this
16idea. An exogenous variable g, a component of product demand, is temporarily low but it
is public knowledge that it will return to its normal level fairly soon.
The expectation that an exogenous component of product demand will rise in the future
implies that resources are expected to become scarcer in the future and thus the interest rate
may be negative to induce consumers to consume more in the present to take advantage of
the lower scarcity. Thus, the anticipation of later higher exogenous purchases can cause the
zero lower bound on the interest rate to bind.
The condition that generates the negative rate is the expected increase in exogenous
purchases g. To overcome consumers' tendency to equalize current and future consumption
and induce them to consume more in early years when output is more plentiful because
exogenous demand is lower, the interest rate is negative. Krugman (1998) makes the re-
lated assumption in an endowment economy that the endowment declines from the rst to
subsequent periods. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) generate negative rates from tightening
of borrowing limits which cause households to raise precautionary saving and to plan later
increases in consumption, which, in equilibrium, are partially discouraged by the negative
rates. My setup mimics theirs in a broad sense.
Exogenous purchases g, take on only two values, 0 and  g. The economy begins with
g = 0 and switches permanently to g =  g sometime thereafter. Its law of motion is
Prob[g
0 =  gjg = 0] = : (25)
and
Prob[g
0 =  gjg =  g] = 1: (26)
Until purchases pop up to  g, the economy expects resources to become scarcer in the fu-
ture and consumers correspondingly expect their consumption to decline. With sucient
expected decline, the equilibrium interest rate is negative and the zero bound may bind.
3.5 Technology, capital, and consumption











At the end of the period, consumption and exogenous purchases occur. Remaining output













2 + v + g: (30)
I let q be the market or shadow price of installed capital. Firms solve the atemporal capital-
installation problem:
max




2   (x + 1)k: (31)
The rst-order condition is:
x = q   1: (32)
Tobin's investment equation. The coecient  controls capital adjustment. If  is very large,
capital does not adjust at all; the economy is the endowment economy of Lucas (1978). If
 = 0, capital adjusts without impediment and q is always one.




(1   )q0 + (1   )n0k0 
q
: (33)
Households have an intertemporal elasticity of substitution . Their realized intertemporal









Households plan consumption to satisfy the Euler equation,
Eg=0 (mR) = (1   )m(k;g;0)R(k;g;0) + m(k;g;  g)R(k;g;  g) = 1 (35)
and
Eg= g (mR) = m(k;g;  g)R(k;g;  g) = 1: (36)






(1   )m(k;0;0) + m(k;0;  g)
(37)
and





m(k;  g;  g)
: (38)
4 Solutions
4.1 The model for g =  g
Because g remains xed at  g once it reaches that level, the model for g =  g is independent
of the model for g = 0. As I noted above, the DMP labor-market model implies a constant
unemployment rate of 5.5 percent once g =  g. There is no ination when g =  g: (k;  g) = 1.
The model has only one unknown function, x(k;  g). I approximate x(k;  g) with an or-
thogonal polynomial in k. A low order polynomial is a completely adequate approximation
because the range of variation of k that I consider is quite limited. Given a candidate for
that function, the following equations yield functions for the other variables: L, constant:
(12), W( g), constant: (14), u( g), constant: (18), n( g), constant: (19), v(k;  g): (27), c(k;  g):
(30), q(k;  g): (32), R(k;  g): (33), m(k;  g) = E m: (34), Rf(k;  g): (38), and Rn(k;  g): (24).
Then the solution process nds the values of the coecients of the polynomial x(k;  g) such
that the Euler equation (36), holds for a grid of values of k that span the domain of k.
4.2 The model for g = 0
After solving the model for g =  g, I solve the model for g = 0 in the same way. The model
for g = 0 uses the previously derived function x(k;  g) and other variables derived from it
where transitions to the state g =  g occur. I consider three versions of the model:
 Full model: The risk-free nominal return ratio, Rn(k;0), takes on a specied value  R
(1 in the case of the zero lower bound), and the ination ratio function (k;0) and
unemployment u(k;0) are equilibrium objects.
 Product-market model: The nominal return ratio Rn(k;0) =  R and the ination ratio
function (k;0) are given, and unemployment u(k;0) is an equilibrium object not
controlled by the DMP labor-market model.
19 Labor-market model: The ination ratio function (k;0) is given, and unemployment
u(k;0) is an equilibrium object controlled by the DMP labor-market model by itself.
In the full model with Rn(k;0) =  R given, there are three unknown functions: x(k;0),
W(k;0), and (k;0), each represented as a polynomial in k. Given candidates for those func-
tions, the following equations yield values of the other variables: L, constant: (12), u(k;0):
(17), n(k;0): (19), v(k;0): (27), c(k;0): (30), q(k;0): (32), R(k;0;g0): (33), m(k;0;g0): (34),
and Rf(k;0): (37). The solution process nds polynomials x(k;0), W(k;0), and (k;0) that
solve the Euler equation (35), the Fisher equation (24), and equation (13) for the present
value of starting wages, on a grid of values of k. The solved (k;0) in these solutions is very
close to constant over k.
In the product-market model with Rn(k;0) =  R and (k;0) = 0 given, the equations of
the DMP labor-market model do not appear. Unemployment is an unknown function u(k;0)
along with x(k;0). Given candidates for the unknown functions, the following equations
yield values of the other variables: n(k;0): (19), v(k;0): (27), c(k;0): (30), q(k;0): (32),
R(k;0;g0): (33), m(k;0;g0): (34), and Rf(k;0): (37). The solution process nds x(k;0)
and u(k;0) that solve the Euler equation (35) and the Fisher equation (24). The product-
market model resembles the models used in earlier work on the zero lower bound, where
unemployment is a free variable that replaces the interest rate, so to speak, in clearing the
current-period output market.
In the labor-market model with (k;0) = 0 given, u(k;0) = u(0) is the unknown
variable, calculated directly from: L, constant: (12), W(0), constant over k: (13), u(0),
constant over k: (17).
5 Parameters
I use generally accepted parameter values: The elasticity of output with respect to labor
input is  = 0:646, the utility discount is  = 0:9997 at a quarterly rate, capital deterioration
is  = 0:0188 per quarter, capital adjustment cost is  = 8, the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is  = 0:5, and the labor turnover rate is s = 3  0:04 = 0:12 per quarter. I
specify the process for growth of exogenous purchases as  g = 0:234 (5 percent of stationary
output) and probability of remaining at zero of  = 0:9, so the expected growth of g is 0.5
percent of stationary output per quarter.
206 Equilibria
6.1 Equilibria of the full model without a sticky starting wage
If ! = 0, so that the equilibrium unemployment rate is the constant u in both g states,
equilibrium in the product market when g = 0 requires that the real interest ratio have the
value R
f such that unemployment from the product-market model is equal to u. I calibrate
the DMP equations so that u = 5:5 percent. Then, for a give ination ratio 0, the unique




Two conclusions follow: First, if the ination rate is exible and responds immediately







Second, if the ination rate is given, the only value of the nominal interest ratio com-
patible with equilibrium is Rn = 0R
f. At any other rate, the two models of unemployment
would clash.
Existing models of the zero lower bound (Rn = 1) have not considered this issue because
they take the ination rate as somewhat exible and because they do not typically have any
model of the labor market. They take unemployment as a free variable.
Figure 4 shows the unemployment rates from the labor- and product-market models with
Rn = 1 for a range of rates of ination and a prospective increase in exogenous purchases
of three percent of stationary output. Ination has no role in the labor market, so that
line is vertical at 5.5 percent. Unemployment from the product-market model is higher for
lower ination rates because the real interest rate is higher and the excess supply of current
output is correspondingly higher. The gure illustrates the basic point of the paper, that the
labor-market model and the product-market model give clashing answers to the question of
what happens in an economy where the real interest rate is above its market-clearing level,
that is, when ination is too low to deliver the market-clearing real rate because the nominal














































Figure 4: Equilibrium without sticky nominal wages
6.2 Equilibria of the full model with a sticky starting wage
Figure 5 repeats Figure 4 for the case ! = 1, so the initial nominal wage remains xed for
the duration of the job. The prospective increase in exogenous purchases is one percent of
stationary output. Now the unemployment rate from the DMP labor-market model also
slopes downward. At positive ination rates, real wages erode in the course of a job because
they remain constant in nominal terms. The job value|the present value of the employer's
benet from the employment relationship|is higher. Employers recruit more aggressively
and the unemployment rate is lower than its value at the zero-ination calibration point, 5.5
percent. With deation, the reverse happens and unemployment is high.
Figure 5 shows two intersections of the labor- and product-market curves. One occurs at
a positive ination rate and a tight labor market. The zero nominal rate set by the central
bank results in a negative real interest rate, which implies a high level of output and labor
demand from the product-market model. It is hard to see why this case would arise under
modern central banking, because it places interest-rate policy far o any plausible Taylor
rule.
The interesting feature of Figure 5 is the second intersection with deation and high












































Figure 5: Equilibrium with sticky nominal wages
starting in late 2008, when the Fed set the nominal rate close to zero. It shows that the
simple model of this paper, with sticky nominal wages during the course of employment, can
overcome the apparent clash between unemployment theories.
For ination rates between the two points marked with discs, the full model has no
equilibrium. Again, the clash between the two theories of unemployment is unresolved.
Depending on one's view of the determination of the rate of price change, this nding implies
either that the model is incapable of explaining what happens at those intermediate rates of
change or that the equilibrium rate of price change does not lie in that interval.
To generate an equilibrium satisfying the zero lower bound with deation, two things
happen. First, the high unemployment while g = 0 results in a level of consumption during
that time that is below its level when g pops up. By contrast, in the case of xed unem-
ployment (! = 0), consumption contracts when g pops up. In the model of Figure 5, at the
lowest price change ratio shown (0 = 0:9984 at a quarterly rate), at the stationary level of
capital, consumption is 2.763. It rises to 2.970 when g pops up. By contrast, in the low
unemployment equilibrium with shown at the top, consumption falls from 3.048 to 2.992
when g pops up. The expected growth of consumption lowers the discounter m and raises
Rn = 0= E (m) enough to oset the low value of 0.















































Figure 6: Equilibrium with Sticky Nominal Wages and Larger Increase in Exogenous Pur-
chases
boost to the return to capital to oset the reduction in the marginal product of capital that
results from the low level of employment. q rises from 0:979 in the depressed economy when
g remains at zero to 1:002 after g pops up. The return to capital is essentially the sum of the
marginal product of capital net of depreciation and the rate of change of q, so the potential
jump in q osets the low marginal product.
Figure 6 shows that the high unemployment deationary equilibrium is not universal. It
shows the same economy as the previous gure except that the jump in exogenous purchases
will be three percent of stationary output rather than one percent. The line showing the
solutions to the product-market model ends before the labor-market line crosses it. The
product-market model has no solutions for higher rates of deation.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 describe all of the equilibria of the full model|the intersections
shown in Figure 5. Each marker shows a calculated equilibrium corresponding to the nominal
riskless rate on the horizontal axis, for a large set of closely spaced rates. As in Figure 5, the
nominal wage is sticky in the course of employment and the pending increase in exogenous
spending is small, only one percent of stationary output. In a range of the nominal interest
rate from just below zero to 0.4 percent, two equilibria occur, corresponding to the bifurcation
























































Figure 7: Equilibrium rates of price change given the nominal interest rate
and lower real interest rates and the high-unemployment ones involve deation. For all more
negative interest rates, unemployment is high and becomes higher with more negative rates.
Figure 7 shows the reason. Because the product-market model cannot easily generate low
rates of return, the equilibrium rate of deation must be greater if the nominal interest rate
is lower. But the labor-market model calls for higher unemployment with more deation, as
the reward to employers declines when workers benet from higher real wages as their jobs
progress.
6.3 Conclusions about sticky nominal wages as a reconciliation of
the clash between unemployment theories
Sticky nominal wages can account for high unemployment during episodes of deation. When
a xed norm determines the starting real wage, but the real wage rises in the course of a
job because the wage is sticky in nominal terms, the value of a new worker to an employer
declines, employers put less eort into recruiting, and the labor market softens. Of course,
the result is a naive Phillips curve, subject to all the objections to the implicit behavioral
assumptions of almost any theory of nominal rigidity.
As an account of the behavior of the economy in a deationary slump, the hypothesis






































Figure 8: Equilibrium unemployment rates given the nominal interest rate
bank has set the nominal rate at zero, the rate of ination has to take on the unique value
that reconciles the two models of unemployment. As yet, neither actual experience with the
zero lower bound nor models have reached any reliable conclusion about the determination
of price-level change at the lower bound. The issue of the clash of unemployment theories
would arise if the amount of ination or deation was not at its equilibrium value.
Second, when the lower bound is binding, or if the nominal rate is xed at some value
other than zero, unemployment cannot fall in the range in Figure 8 between the high- and
low-unemployment equilibria. Unemployment would jump from a low level associated with
positive ination to a high level associated with deation.
Third, as Figure 6 shows, a deationary high-unemployment equilibrium may not exist
in the model with sticky nominal wages. Non-existence of equilibrium is a defect of a model,
not a statement about the economy.
7 Other Approaches to Reconciliation
7.1 Variations in market power
Early New Keynesian models featured variations in the markup of product prices over cost
that arose from price stickiness. Most of these models neglected unemployment and generated
26employment volatility through variations in the marginal revenue product of capital. The
rst part of Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010) extends the labor market in an
early New Keynesian model to include unemployment. The extension does not follow the
principles of the DMP model. Instead, employers face a conventional labor supply schedule
and the external labor market clears. Families have an internal labor market where members
have a probability less than one of nding a job each period. The probability rises with
search eort. The model of the rst part of the paper generates cyclical uctuations in
unemployment as total employment moves along the labor-supply curve. A similar result
would follow in a DMP model, where the marginal revenue product of labor would fall in
a monetary contraction that enlarged markups as rms kept older, higher prices when the
contraction lowered their costs.
More recent New Keynesian models tend to follow Christiano et al. (2005) in placing
the most important nominal stickiness in the labor market. The second part of Christiano
et al. (2010) adds unemployment as described above to that type of setup. No clash of
unemployment theories occurs in the paper, because nominal wage stickiness results in rising
market power for workers under a monetary contraction, so unemployment rises. One can
think of the simple nominal stickiness that I have added to the DMP model as pursuing the
same idea with a dierent specication of the search and matching process. Gertler et al.
(2008) also combine a sticky nominal wage with a DMP labor market.
Papers in the New Keynesian framework have not reported non-existence of equilibrium
in their models or the discontinuities in unemployment demonstrated in Section 5 of this
paper. Given the complexity of New Keynesian models, it is a considerable challenge to
track down the dierences that allow the models to overcome the defects of the simple
model considered here.
7.2 Excess supply in the product market
The second approach drops the strong assumption that no other endogenous variable enters
the DMP model. Instead, the solution to the product-market model is viewed as one of
excess supply in the product market and a corresponding constraint on the sales of each
rm. So far, to my knowledge, no author in this area has worked out the mechanism that
maps excess supply in the market to this constraint on individual rms. The proposition
seems dangerously close to Aristotle's fallacy of division, attributing to each component of
27an entity a property of that entity.
The logic of excess supply with a binding lower bound is straightforward. Given a zero
interest rate when only a negative one would clear the product market, producers are unable
to sell as much current output as much as they would nd it remunerative to produce. The
analysis of the consequences of excess supply is close to the simple Keynesian expenditure
model|when full-employment output would result in an excess of saving over investment,
output falls to a lower level where saving and investment are equal.
In the conditions created by a binding lower bound on the interest rate, rms face con-
straints on the amount they can sell. To incorporate the DMP analysis of the labor market
in that setting, one must take a stand on the benet that accrues to a constrained rm by
hiring another worker. I'm not aware that the issues involved in characterizing the benet
have yet been thought through.
The marginal benet of adding a worker is the key connection in the DMP model between
the product and labor markets. To generate high unemployment in a regular DMP model,
the marginal benet needs to drop below its normal level. Although it is tempting to conclude
that a rm with constrained output has no benet from an added worker, factor substitution
stands in the way of that simple conclusion. If the rm cannot sell more output, the rm
can still substitute away from other inputs when it hires a worker. Material inputs seem
the most likely substitution opportunity. No framework yet exists to measure the marginal
benet of labor.
I believe that the hypothesis of excess product supply is ripe for further development.
7.3 The exible unemployment hypothesis
Now I turn to a third and quite dierent approach to reconciling the excess-supply theory of
unemployment and the DMP theory. This approach|based on what I call the exible un-
employment hypothesis|makes the assumption that the wage-determination function slopes
downward just enough to lie on top of the zero-prot function. Recall from Figure 3 that
only a small clockwise twist of the wage-determination function is enough to accomplish this





Under this hypothesis, workers pay less for their jobs when unemployment is higher. By co-













































Figure 9: Unemployment as a function of ination under the exible unemployment hypoth-
esis
that raties the higher unemployment.
Inserting this job value into the zero-prot condition that determines the unemployment





which is satised for all levels of unemployment. Unemployment is no longer constrained by
the DMP model.
When the interest rate is pinned at zero, unemployment takes its value from the product-
market model discussed earlier. Figure 9 shows unemployment as a function of the rate of
price change, given a zero nominal interest rate (as in Figure 6, ! = 1 and the pending
increase in exogenous product demand is three percent of stationary output). In an economy
with a determinate rate of price change, this model would provide a reasonable account of
high unemployment in deationary slumps. If some exogenous force caused ination to be
close to zero or negative at the same time that some force caused low interest rates, high
unemployment would occur and would last as long as ination and product demand remained
below normal.
Obviously the main shortcoming of the exible unemployment hypothesis is its foundation
upon a coincidence in the positions of the zero-prot and wage determination curves.
29A second issue is the fundamental indeterminacy of unemployment and other variables.
One can think of Figure 9 as describing the relationship between the real interest rate and
unemployment|variations in the rate of ination given the nominal rate correspond to
variations in the real rate. The economy can have a low real rate and a low unemployment
rate (at the upper left, with higher ination) or a high real rate and high unemployment
rate (lower right). These conditions last until the transition to normal g. Given a rate of
ination, the central bank could choose the nominal rate to determine the unemployment
rate. To the extent that the ination rate is free to change, the central bank is not assured
of control over unemployment.
The exible-unemployment hypothesis implies a modest negative slope of the wage- de-
termination function|when unemployment is high, workers pay less for their jobs. This
property strikes me as reasonably intuitive. A worker pays the job value to the employer for
the privilege of holding the job. If a higher investment of search time is also required to gain
the job, shouldn't the worker pay less for the job?





for hourly compensation, with the marginal product of labor held constant. I assume that
the job value is deducted from compensation in equal amounts spread over the duration of
the job. To estimate that duration, I take the reciprocal of the total separation rate reported
in JOLTS, averaged over the period December 2000 through December 2010. The average
rate is 4.2 percent per month, implying an average duration of 24 months per job. Average
pay in the U.S. economy in January 2011 was $19.07. I add $0.23 as the amortized hourly
job value, to get an estimate of $19.30 as the average marginal product of labor. I use the






The line labeled Compensation per hour including search hours is compensation per hour
multiplied by one minus the unemployment rate.
Compensation per hour rises slightly with unemployment, while compensation per hour
including unemployment time falls substantially. One reason that JZ(u) rises with u may be




























Figure 10: Relation between Hourly Compensation and Unemployment, with Marginal Prod-
uct of Labor Held Constant
unemployment is higher. That is, job-seekers are willing to pay less for jobs when jobs take
longer to nd.
The value lost from higher unemployment is vastly greater than the value gained from
the decline in the job value. Thus higher unemployment unambiguously lowers the earnings
of members of the labor force even though it raises the hourly wages while employed.
Figure 10 understates the rise in pay per hour of work as unemployment rises in the
model that follows, because the marginal product of labor rises with declining employment.
The exible-employment hypothesis species a modest negative relation between unem-
ployment and the job value negotiated for new jobs by workers and employers. The job value
describes the point along the contract curve resulting from the parties' bargain. Any non-
negative job value not exceeding the job-seeker's productivity is in the bargaining set and is
therefore consistent with the fundamental principles of bilateral bargaining. The necessary
negative relation between unemployment and the job value could arise as an equilibrium
selection rule. The other way is that the bargaining protocol|such as alternating-oer
bargaining|has a unique equilibrium that happens to match the needed relationship.
Hall (2005) discusses the fundamentals of the wage bargain. The most general view of
a bilateral bargain limits the outcome in only one way|if the parties have a joint surplus,
31they will successfully bargain to a point where each receives a non-negative share of that
surplus. The division of the surplus is indeterminate. For example, if the employer and
worker engage in the two-sided demand auction of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), any
wage in the bargaining set is a Nash equilibrium (not to be confused with a Nash bargain).
In that auction, the parties submit wage bids simultaneously. If the employer's bid does
not fall short of the job-seeker's bid, employment occurs at the average of the two bids.
Otherwise, the parties do not contract. The employer's best response to a wage bid from the
job-seeker that is no higher than the job-seeker's productivity is to match the wage. The
job-seeker's best response to a wage bid that is no lower than the job-seeker's reservation
wage is to match the bid. The bargaining set runs from the reservation wage to productivity.
Hence any wage in the bargaining set is a Nash equilibrium.
My earlier paper demonstrated that a wide class of state-contingent wages satises the
condition that the wage is in the bargaining set in every state. All of these state-contingent
wage functions are candidate equilibria of the wage bargaining problem. For example, they
are all Nash equilibria of the demand auction.
In the setup considered in this paper, the bargaining is over the job value J rather than
the wage itself, but the point is the same. The employer's reservation value of J is zero|it is
remunerative to hire a worker for any positive job value that the worker pays. The worker's
reservation value is the worker's opportunity cost of taking the job. The bargaining set runs
from zero to the opportunity cost.
8 Employment Fluctuations Resulting from Shifts in
the Zero-Prot Curve
Part of the increase in unemployment since late 2008 in the United States appears to have
arisen from an adverse shift of the zero-prot curve. Recruiting success rates are not as
high as they should be, given high unemployment, according to historical relations. It is an
unexplored question whether this shift has anything to do with the excess supply of current
output induced by the zero lower bound.
Recent work has studied the adverse shift from the perspective of the Beveridge curve (the
joint behavior of unemployment and vacancies) and the matching function, I will approach
the topic via the zero-prot curve to relate to the analysis in Figure 1 as closely as possible.
I document a limited amount of instability of the zero-prot function. The adverse shift
32is not large enough to be a candidate to explain more than a fraction of the increase in
unemployment in 2008 and 2009.





To evaluate Jt, I need a value for the vacancy-posting cost  and an estimate of the recruiting-
success rate ht.
Hall and Milgrom (2008) calculate that the daily cost of maintaining a vacancy is 0.43
days of pay, based on data from Silva and Toledo (2008), or  = $66 per day for the average
U.S. employee in January 2011.





where Ht is the number of hires during a month and Vt is the average number of vacancies
open during the month, approximated as openings at the beginning of the month. Both
series are from the BLS's Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). I divide by
21 as the number of working days in a month.
To estimate the hiring success rate function h(u), I regress ht on the unemployment rate ut
from the Current Population Survey for the period from December 2000 (the onset of JOLTS)
to June 2009 (omitting data from the anomalous period in the second half of 2009 and 2010).
I also include a linear trend. The identifying assumption|lack of correlation between the
unemployment rate and the disturbances in the hiring rate|is consistent with the theme of
the paper that the product market determines the unemployment rate, not factors relating
to the labor market. The regression appears in the top panel of Table 1. It shows a robust
positive relationship between the recruiting success rate and the unemployment rate.
The lower panel of Table 1 shows estimates of the daily probability (u) that a job-seeker
will nd a job. The left-hand variable is the ratio of the number of hires reported in JOLTS
to the number of unemployed workers in the CPS, divided by 21 to place it on a daily basis.
There is a robust negative relation between the job-nding rate and the unemployment rate.
Figure 11 shows the calculated job value Jt since the inception of JOLTS. The job value
is strongly pro-cyclical. New workers pay their employers|in the form of a wage below their
marginal products|more in good times, such as the middle of the decade of the 2000s, and
33Intercept Slope Trend
Standard error of 
the regression
Daily recruiting sucess rate h(u) 0.0371 0.545 -0.000082 0.0037
(0.0020) (0.037) (0.000013)
Daily job-finding rate φ(u) 0.064219 -0.593 -0.000019 0.0022
(0.001173) (0.022) (0.000008)





























Figure 11: Job Value Calculated from JOLTS
less during slumps, such as 2001 to 2003 and 2008 to 2011. The small light squares in the
gure show the job values calculated from the tted values of ht from the regression.
Figure 12 is a scatter diagram with unemployment on the horizontal axis and the job value
Jt on the vertical axis. It distinguishes the cycle|contraction and expansion|running from
2000 to 2007 and shown with a solid red line from the second cycle that started in 2008, shown
as a double blue line. The earlier cycle follows a reasonably well-dened negatively sloped
line, both during the contraction and during the subsequent expansion. The contraction
starting in 2008 (not yet retraced by the modest expansion that has occurred to date) is
somewhat atter than the earlier one. Unemployment rose dramatically, but the hiring rate
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Figure 12: Job Value J Plotted against Unemployment
started in 2001.
A second anomaly appears at the trough of the contraction in 2009 and 2010, when
unemployment lingered just below 10 percent but the hiring rate fell by as much as it would
have in a substantial expansion. This behavior has been widely discussed. It corresponds to
an inward shift of the matching function. See Hall (2010).
Figure 13 is a scatter diagram with the unemployment/vacancy ratio on the horizontal
axis and job value Jt on the vertical axis. That ratio or its reciprocal is the exact measure of
labor-market tightness in the standard DMP model. Comparison of the two scatter diagrams
suggests that not much of the anomalous behavior in Figure 12 is the result of the neglect
of the dynamics of job matching, which in principle are handled exactly in Figure 13, but
without much improvement in t.
The broad joint movements over the period from 2000 to 2011 of unemployment and the
calculated job value Jt suggest a roughly stable relationship |unemployment was high early
in the period when the job value was low, fell to reasonable levels in the middle of the decade
when J was high, and rose to a very high peak when J fell starting in 2008. Notice that
unemployment is not an input to the calculation of J. Of course, tracking down the sources
of the departures from stability is still an interesting undertaking. Nothing in what follows



































Figure 13: Job Value J Plotted against the Unemployment/Vacancy Ratio
additional variables to account for what appear to be shifts in the joint behavior of u and J.
9 Concluding Remarks
Macroeconomics badly needs to resolve the conict between a theory of unemployment based
on excess supply in the current product market and the DMP theory based on equilibrium
in the labor market. A regular DMP model|one where a slack labor market improves the
bargaining outcome for the employer|cannot coexist with a standard model of excess supply
resulting from a binding lower bound on the interest rate. Either (1) the excess-supply model
needs to include an element that reduces the benet to the employer from a new hire or (2)
the DMP model needs to include the exible-employment property that a slack labor market
improves the bargaining outcome for the worker by just the right amount to make the DMP
unemployment rate indeterminate.
An extended period of high unemployment in the U.S. economy with the risk-free interest
rate pinned at zero has left believers in the DMP model puzzled about the forces that caused
such a large change in the labor market. Although some of the rise in unemployment appears
to be the associated with an adverse shift of the matching function, most seems to be the
result of forces that operate in the product market, much amplied by the inability of the
36interest rate to fall enough to restore current product demand to normal levels.
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